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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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22 results foundAuthor: Blumstein, Alfred Title: Potential of Redemption in Criminal Background Checks Summary: Background checking, especially checking of criminal-history records, is becoming increasingly ubiquitous in the U.S. Recent advances in information technology and growing concern about employer liability have combined to increase the demand for such background checks. Also, a large number of individual criminal records have accumulated and been computerized in state repositories and commercial databases. As a result, many people who have made mistakes in their youthful past, but have since lived a law-abiding life face hardships in finding employment. The concern is evidenced by the report from the Attorney General sent to Congress in June, 2006 on criminal history background checks (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006). In the report, there is a recommendation for time limits on the relevancy of criminal records, which reflects the fact that the potentially lasting effect of criminal records is a common concern among many governmental and legal entities that have a say in this issue. Such entities include the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is concerned about discrimination based on criminal records because those with criminal records are disproportionately racial/ethnic minorities. The American Bar Association (ABA) is also concerned about the negative lasting effect of criminal records in employment settings. Both these organizations are taking an initiative to broaden the discussion about the problem of the way in which criminal records are currently used and to address how to regulate the use of criminal records, including a time limit on their relevancy. It is our goal in this project to provide guidance on the possibility of “redemption,” (which we define as the process of lifting the burden of the prior record), and to provide guidance on how one may estimate when such redemption is appropriate. Numerous studies have shown in the past that recidivism probability declines with time “clean,” so there is some point in time when a person with a criminal record who remained free of further contact with the criminal justice system is of no greater risk than any counterpart, an indication of redemption from the mark of an offender. We henceforth call this time point “redemption time.” Sections of this report discuss the recent trends about the practice of criminal background checking, particularly by employers, and the volume of computerized criminal records that are available for such background checks. They also address the problem of the lack of guidelines that could help employers understand how the “age” of a criminal record relates to the level of risk of a new crime. By discussing the trends, we demonstrate that the problem of redemption is a pressing public concern, and that empirically based guidance on redemption is urgently needed. Details: Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University, 2010. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232358.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232358.pdf Shelf Number: 120364 Keywords: Background ChecksCriminal RecordsEmploymentEx-Offenders |
Author: Rose, Andree Title: Developing a Cybervetting Strategy for Law Enforcement. Special Report. Summary: Cybervetting is an assessment of a person's suitability to hold a position using information found on the Internet to help make that determination. Cybervetting occurs even though there are no generally accepted guidelines and procedures for fair, complete, and efficient Internet searches for this purpose. Job applicants, employees, and employers are often uncertain whether cybervetting is legal, where privacy rights begin and end, and what cyber behaviors and postings should be subject to cybervetting. The purpose of this document is to present policies and practices to consider when using the Internet to search for information on law enforcement applicants, candidates, and incumbents, and when developing social media policies to limit inappropriate online behaviors. Cybervetting guidelines need to strike the right balance between individuals' constitutional rights and law enforcement agencies' due diligence responsibilities for screening out undesirable job applicants and employees. Details: Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2010. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 7, 2011 at: http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Portals/1/documents/CybervettingReport.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Portals/1/documents/CybervettingReport.pdf Shelf Number: 120697 Keywords: Background ChecksInternetPersonnel ManagementPolice Recruitment and Selection |
Author: Mayors Against Illegal Guns Title: Fatal Gaps: How Missing Records in the Federal Background Check System Put Guns in the Hands of Killers Summary: Since its creation in 1999, the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) has blocked more than 1.6 million permit applications and gun sales to felons, the seriously mentally ill, drug abusers and other dangerous people who are prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms. Completing the necessary paperwork for a background check takes a gun buyer mere minutes, and more than 91 percent of these electronic screens are completed instantaneously. And, amidst a polarized national debate about gun control, the background check system enjoys nearly universal public support. Despite its relative success, NICS has serious gaps and limitations that still allow firearms to be sold to dangerous people, including some of the nation’s worst mass murderers. The NICS database can access the names of individuals who are barred from possessing guns due to citizenship status and other prohibiting factors with relative ease. That data is regularly and efficiently shared among government and law enforcement agencies. But, for complex legal and logistical reasons discussed in this report, records about the kinds of serious mental health and drug abuse problems that disqualify people from gun ownership have proven more difficult to capture. In 2007, Seung Hui Cho shot and killed 32 people at Virginia Tech before taking his own life. More than a year earlier, a judge had found Cho to be mentally ill—a determination that should have barred him for life from possessing a firearm. But the records documenting his profound mental illness were never submitted to NICS, and Cho was able to pass several background checks before buying the guns he used in the mass shooting. On January 8, 2011 Jared Loughner shot and killed six people and critically wounded 13 others in Tucson, including Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. Media reports indicated that Loughner had a troubled past that included a drug-related arrest, an admission of drug use to the U.S. Army and suspension from community college for a pattern of disturbing behavior. He nevertheless passed background checks and bought firearms on two separate occasions, including the Glock 19 he used in his attempt to assassinate Congresswoman Giffords. News accounts suggested that Loughner’s admission of drug use should have barred him from purchasing his first gun, an assertion the government has never confirmed. After the Tucson mass shooting, Mayors Against Illegal Guns conducted an investigation to discover why critical mental health and drug abuse records are missing from the NICS database. We obtained Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data on the number of records states and federal agencies have shared with the system, analyzed related state and federal policies and interviewed more than 60 government officials responsible for NICS record collection and submission in 49 states and the District of Columbia. Based on our analysis and FBI data released on October 31, 2011, we drew the following conclusions: Millions of records identifying seriously mentally ill people and drug abusers as prohibited purchasers are missing from the federal background check database because of lax reporting by state agencies. • Many state mental health records are still missing: Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have submitted fewer than 100 mental health records to the federal database. Seventeen states have submitted fewer than ten mental health records, and four states have not submitted any records at all. • State substance abuse records are also underreported: Forty-four states have submitted fewer than ten records to the controlled substance file in the NICS Index, and 33 have not submitted any records at all. Even though federal regulations and policy establish that a failed drug test, single drug-related arrest or admission of drug use within the past year temporarily disqualify a person from possessing a gun, the vast majority of states are unaware that these records should be shared with NICS. • While still inadequate, mental health record reporting by the states has improved: From August 2010 to October 2011, the number of state-submitted mental health records in the federal background check database increased by 35.4 percent. • States with the highest rates of mental health record submission have typically enacted policies that require or permit reporting of records: Nine of the ten states that submit the most mental health records per capita have adopted laws or policies that mandate or permit the sharing of mental health records with NICS, while just two of the ten states that submit records at the lowest rates have such laws or policies. • States with access to federal funding tend to submit more records: From August 2010 to October 2011, the nine states that received NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) grants to improve NICS submission increased their rate of mental health record sharing by nearly twice as many records per capita as states with no federal funding. • Leadership makes a difference: In each state that has significantly improved at sharing records with the federal database, one or more state actors have taken the lead in identifying and surmounting the logistical, legal and political obstacles to compliance. Federal agencies are not reporting records to NICS despite a federal law requiring all federal agencies to report “any record of any person” who is prohibited from purchasing firearms to the FBI. • Federal agencies have shared very few mental health records: 52 of the 61 agencies for which the FBI keeps relevant data have reported no mental health records to NICS. The vast majority of federal records were submitted by just one agency—the Department of Veterans Affairs. • Most federal agencies have not submitted any substance abuse records: Only three federal agencies—the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Court Services and Offenders Supervision Agency (CSOSA)—have shared any substance abuse records with NICS, with the vast majority submitted by CSOSA. • A Clinton-era policy directive may discourage federal reporting: Federal agencies may continue to rely on a policy memorandum issued in 1994 by former Attorney General Janet Reno that instructs federal agencies not to submit certain substance abuse records to NICS. Details: S.l.: Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2011. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 15, 2011 at: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/maig_mimeo_revb.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/maig_mimeo_revb.pdf Shelf Number: 123362 Keywords: Background ChecksCriminal RecordsGun ControlIllegal Guns |
Author: Green, Anthony Title: Auditing the Cost of the Virginia Tech Massacre: How Much We Pay When Killers Kill Summary: Five years ago, on April 16, 2007, an English major at Virginia Tech University named Seung-Hui Cho gunned down and killed 32 people, wounded another 17, and then committed suicide as the police closed in on him on that cold, bloody Monday. Since then, 12 more spree killings have claimed the lives of another 90 random victims and wounded another 92 people who were in the wrong place at the wrong time when deranged and well-armed killers suddenly burst upon their daily lives. This carnage includes the very recent killing by Ohio high school student T.J. Lane of three of his fellow students with a gun he took out of his grandfather’s barn, which also wounded two others. Lane’s revolver held 10 bullets, and he fired all 10. As we went to press, still another spree killing took place on a university campus where at least seven were killed and three wounded. This most recent spree killing— the 13th, including Cho’s rampage at Virginia Tech five years ago—occurred at a small religious college near Oakland, California, called Oikos University. What links these tragedies? It’s simple: histories indicating dangerousness combined with the lack of adequate gun control. Cho had a history of mental illness but was able to bypass the national gun purchase background check system and buy two weapons to accomplish his meticulously planned spree killing. He also bought a number of high-capacity magazines, which supersized his weapons. Well-armed, he was able to commit his carnage in no more than 15 minutes, pausing in between his two attacks. The human toll of this, the worst spree killing in recent American history, is incalculable, but there are financial costs that can be calculated. In March 2012 a state court jury in Montgomery County, Virginia, found that Virginia Tech was negligent and awarded $4 million each to two families of victims. The lawsuit was based on the families’ allegations that the lives of the students could have been saved if the university warned the campus community more quickly after the first of the two killings, which took place on the same morning. The damage award may be reduced to $100,000 for each family due to the state’s cap on damages. But as we go to press, the issue of the damages is being argued by the parties before the trial court judge. Further, whether the university appeals the verdict is still an open question. In a completely different legal action, the U.S. Department of Education fined the university $55,000 under the Clery Act, which requires universities to give notice of dangers affecting students. The university appealed, the U.S. Department of Education rejected the appeal, and subsequently a federal administrative court judge in April 2012 ruled in favor of Virginia Tech. These possible courtroom costs, however, pale in comparison to the cost of negligence due to the failure of ambiguous gun control laws alongside the lack of any genuine effort by federal or state officials to clarify the laws so that state police and courts can enforce them to the fullest extent of the law. This lack of enforcement of poorly written laws enables mentally ill people to pass background checks and purchase guns legally even if they have a history indicating dangerousness, including those found by courts to be mentally ill or subject to orders of confinement to a mental health facility. This breakdown in our legal system results in the inestimable loss of life and its horror and consequence. Sadly, we can calculate this cost another way. Another outcome of the lack of gun control is the taxpayer’s bill for a spree killing. In this report we share the findings of our survey of the monetary costs incurred as a result of this murderous rampage at Virginia Tech five years ago. This paper assesses this cost at $48.2 million for the taxpayers of the United States and the commonwealth of Virginia, and for Virginia Tech, a public university. This report also demonstrates how the background-check system, still rife with loopholes, failed to protect American citizens from an armed and dangerous Seung-Hui Cho, costing innocent lives—many of them young ones. The loss of one innocent life to a mentally disturbed shooter should be reason enough to close the gaping holes in the system that permit gun purchases and access to high-capacity magazines that can cause such mayhem. The Virginia Tech tragedy drives this point home in the most dramatic of ways because of the sheer number of deaths and extraordinary financial costs. For this reason, we recommend several commonsense measures designed to curb gun violence without taking a single gun away from the great majority of Americans who have the right to own a weapon. These measures are detailed in main pages of our report, but briefly we recommend: Completing state compliance with requirements to post appropriate mental health records in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System; Establishing clear reporting guidelines for when and how mental health records are required to be posted in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System so that states can be held accountable for compliance; Requiring a full background check in all gun transactions, including private sales at gun shows and those online, so that dangerous people cannot purchase guns legally in these nontraditional venues; Fully funding state technology efforts to comply with the federal background check system requirements; Requiring states to comply fully with the protocols of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System or taking away their federal funding if they do not; and Mandating federal compliance with a proposed presidential executive order directing all agencies to submit records to this instant background check system and certifying that they have done so twice yearly to the U.S. attorney general. In addition we offer two other recommendations for Congress to enact arising from the lessons of Virginia Tech: Outlawing high-capacity bullet magazines; and Requiring campuses to establish a threat assessment process. Taking these commonsense steps would go a long way toward ending the spree killing rampages that continue to haunt our nation. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2012. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 15, 2012 at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/04/pdf/vt_gun_control.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/04/pdf/vt_gun_control.pdf Shelf Number: 124968 Keywords: Background ChecksCampus CrimeCosts of Criminal JusticeGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceMass ShootingsSchool ShootingsViolent Crime |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Gun Control: Sharing Promising Practices and Assessing Incentives Could Better Position Justice to Assist States in Providing Records for Background Checks Summary: From 2004 to 2011, the total number of mental health records that states made available to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) increased by approximately 800 percent—from about 126,000 to 1.2 million records—although a variety of challenges limited states’ ability to share such records. This increase largely reflects the efforts of 12 states. However, almost half of all states increased the number of mental health records they made available by fewer than 100 over this same time period. Technological, legal, and other challenges limited the states’ ability to share mental health records. To help address these challenges, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provides assistance to states, such as grants and training, which the 6 states GAO reviewed reported as helpful. DOJ has begun to have states share their promising practices at conferences, but has not distributed such practices nationally. By disseminating practices that states used to overcome barriers to sharing mental health records, DOJ could further assist states efforts. The states’ overall progress in making unlawful drug use records available to NICS is generally unknown because of how these records are maintained. The vast majority of records made available are criminal records—such as those containing arrests or convictions for possession of a controlled substance—which cannot readily be disaggregated from other records in the databases checked by NICS. Most states are not providing noncriminal records, such as those related to positive drug test results for persons on probation. On May 1, 2012, DOJ data showed that 30 states were not making any noncriminal records available. Four of the 6 states GAO reviewed raised concerns about providing records outside an official court decision. Two states also noted that they did not have centralized databases that would be needed to collect these records. DOJ has issued guidance for providing noncriminal records to NICS. DOJ has not administered the reward and penalty provisions of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 because of limitations in state estimates of the number of records they possess that could be made available to NICS. DOJ officials were unsure if the estimates, as currently collected, could reach the level of precision needed to serve as the basis for implementing the provisions. The 6 states GAO reviewed had mixed views on the extent to which the reward and penalty provisions—if implemented as currently structured—would provide incentives for them to make more records available. DOJ had not obtained the states’ views. Until DOJ establishes a basis for administering these provisions—which could include revising its current methodology for collecting estimates or developing a new basis—and determining the extent to which the current provisions provide incentives to states, the department cannot provide the incentives to states that were envisioned by the act. Nineteen states have received federal certification of their programs that allow individuals with a precluding mental health adjudication or commitment to seek relief from the associated firearms prohibition. Having such a program is required to receive grants under the 2007 NICS act. Officials from 10 of the 16 states we contacted said that grant eligibility was a strong incentive for developing the program. Reductions in grant funding could affect incentives moving forward. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592452.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592452.pdf Shelf Number: 125631 Keywords: Background ChecksGun Control (U.S.)Gun Control PolicyMental Health Records |
Author: Homeland Security Advisory Council. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Task Force on Secure Communities: Findings and Recommendations Summary: The Task Force on Secure Communities is a subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) and was created in June 2011 at the request of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano. HSAC, which is comprised of leaders from state and local government, first responder agencies, the private sector, and academia, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary on matters related to homeland security. The Task Force was asked to consider how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may improve the Secure Communities Program, including how to address some of the concerns about the program that “relate to [its] impact on community policing and the possibility of racial profiling,” and “how to best focus on individuals who pose a true public safety or national security threat.” In addition, the Task Force was specifically charged with making recommendations “on how ICE can adjust the Secure Communities program to mitigate potential impacts on community policing practices, including whether and how to implement policy regarding the removals of individuals charged with, but not convicted of, minor traffic offenses who have no other criminal history.” Under Secure Communities, fingerprints of persons arrested by state and local law enforcement agencies, which those agencies routinely submit to the FBI for criminal justice database checks, are automatically shared with DHS. ICE then checks the local arrestee information against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immigration databases. If ICE determines that it has an interest in an individual arrestee, the agency then determines what enforcement action to take. In most cases, the people determined to be of interest to ICE are subject to ICE enforcement action for reasons independent of the arrest or conviction. That is, the check of databases may indicate, for example, that the person is removable because he or she entered the country without inspection or overstayed a visa. Specific findings and recommendations are offered within. There is a strong consensus view, within the Task Force and in communities across the nation, that it is appropriate for ICE to continue to take enforcement action against serious criminal offenders who are subject to deportation. But because there are circumstances in which Secure Communities results in the removal of persons who are minor offenders or who have never been convicted of a crime, and because statements by ICE have left much confusion about the full reach of its enforcement priorities, many jurisdictions are concerned about the impact of Secure Communities on community policing. We recommend specific steps on which there is Task Force consensus that would help build trust in the program. Many Task Force members would go further, including recommending suspension of the program until major changes are made, or even recommending termination of what they believe is a fundamentally flawed program. Other members believe that reforms are necessary but the program nonetheless must continue to function. Those differences of view are reflected in the discussion below. ICE must recognize that it does not work in a vacuum and that its enforcement actions impact other agencies and the relationships with their communities in what some may conclude is a negative way. The following pages contain recommendations for ICE to revise the program while working with state and local police, elected officials, and other stakeholders, taking their concerns seriously and working in partnership to find appropriate solutions. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2012 at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities-findings-and-recommendations-report.pdf Shelf Number: 126264 Keywords: Background ChecksCommunity PolicingCriminal Aliens (U.S.)Customs EnforcementDeportation |
Author: Violence Policy Center Title: Time Bomb: How the NRA Blocked the Regulation of Black and Smokeless Powder to the Benefit of Its Gun Industry “Corporate Partners” Today Summary: Since the 1970s, the National Rifle Association (NRA) has worked to block federal regulation--including background checks on transfers--of black and smokeless powder. The NRA’s decades-long campaign against regulating these two common explosives today benefits the gun industry “corporate partners” that help fund the organization according to the new Violence Policy Center (VPC) report, Time Bomb: How the NRA Blocked the Regulation of Black and Smokeless Powder to the Benefit of Its Gun Industry “Corporate Partners” Today. The VPC study details how in 1970, in response to a wave of bombings throughout the country, Congress, with the support of the Nixon Administration, moved to consolidate and increase federal regulatory oversight of the explosives industry and its products, including black and smokeless powder. Despite the clear threat posed by black and smokeless powder, the NRA--joined by other pro-gun organizations such as the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF)--worked to ensure that resulting legislation contained an exemption for “small arms ammunition and components thereof” which applied to most smokeless powder as well as to “black powder in quantities not to exceed five pounds.” In 1974, over the protestations of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the NRA successfully lobbied to increase the amount of black powder exempted from federal regulation from five pounds to 50 pounds. The continuing danger posed by the exemptions for smokeless and black powder has been noted by experts. In a review of the implementation of the “Safe Explosives Act” (SEA) passed in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice identified “several issues related to the regulation and safeguarding of explosives in the United States that while not addressed in the SEA nonetheless are relevant to public safety.” Among the issues identified was ATF’s limited authority over smokeless and black powder. The report noted, “Because black powder is relatively inexpensive (between $5 and $15 per pound), it is the most common explosive used in pipe bombs. Additionally, the ATF does not regulate smokeless powder, a more expensive explosive used in the manufacturing of firearms ammunition.” ATF acknowledges the threat to public safety posed by the unregulated sale of black powder and smokeless powder. In a letter sent to Federal Firearms Licensees in July 2004, the agency wrote: “As you may know, explosives are frequently used by terrorists to cause destruction. Some of the products you may carry in your inventory, such as black powder and smokeless powder, could be used in acts of violence. While smokeless powder and black powder generally are exempt from the Federal explosives laws, these products are often used to make illegal or ‘improvised explosives devices’ and pipe bombs.” The letter included a flyer headlined “BE AWARE FOR AMERICA.....” and set out tips to help dealers identify suspicious buyers. Details: Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2013. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 25, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 128441 Keywords: Background ChecksExplosivesGun ViolenceNational Rifle AssociationViolence (U.S.) |
Author: Krouse, William J. Title: Terrorist Watch List Screening and Background Checks for Firearms Summary: The November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, TX, renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening and background checks for firearms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (P.L. 103-159), in November 1998 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activated NICS for the purposes of determining an individual’s firearms transfer and possession eligibility whenever a private person seeks to acquire a firearm from a federally licensed gun dealer. Prior to February 2004, however, the FBI did not conduct terrorist watchlist queries as part of firearms background checks because being a known or suspected terrorist was not a disqualifying factor for firearms transfer and possession eligibility; nor is it today under current law. Similarly, the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing could generate renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening, because at least one of the alleged perpetrators was possibly entered into the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC’s) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). As a consequence, he was possibly watch-listed in the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center’s Terrorist Screening Database—the U.S. government’s master watchlist of known and suspected terrorists. In addition, on April 18, 2013, both alleged perpetrators—Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—are further alleged to have shot and killed a police officer, high-jacked an automobile and taken its owner hostage at gunpoint, and engaged in a subsequent shootout with police. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is tracing a pistol recovered at the scene of the shootout. If the watch-listed brother, Tamerlan, had acquired the pistol from a federally licensed gun dealer, it might have generated a terrorist watchlist hit through NICS. Critics could argue that watchlist hits through NICS, or border and aviation security screening systems, might have prompted federal investigators to scrutinize Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s travels and activities more closely prior to the bombing. As described in this report, moreover, a NICS-generated watchlist match might have prevented him from acquiring the pistol. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government reevaluated its terrorist screening procedures. As part of this process, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI modified the Brady background check procedures and recalibrated NICS to query an additional file in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) that included terrorist watchlist records. Since February 2004, information related to the subjects of NICS-generated terrorist watchlist matches have been passed on to the FBI Counterterrorism Division and special agents in the field, who are usually members of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). These FBI agents, in turn, verify the match between the individual and the watchlist record, and they check for information that would prohibit that individual, the prospective transferee, licensee, or permittee, from possessing firearms or explosives (e.g., illegal immigration or fugitive status). While the modified NICS procedures initially generated little public opposition, those procedures called three possible issues into question. One, should terrorist watchlist checks be incorporated statutorily into the firearms- and explosives-related background check processes? Two, given certain statutory prohibitions related to prohibiting a firearms registry, should approved firearm transfer records be maintained on a temporary basis to determine whether persons of interest in counterterrorism investigations have obtained firearms? Three, should the Attorney General be granted authority to deny a firearms transfer based solely on a terrorist watchlist match? Since the 109th Congress, several related legislative proposals have been introduced. Several of those bills would have addressed the retention of firearms-related transfer records. Another proposal would have prohibited persons watch-listed as terrorists for aviation security purposes on the “No Fly” list from firearms transfer or possession eligibility. In the 110th Congress, Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Peter King introduced a bill based on a legislative proposal developed by DOJ that would have authorized the Attorney General to deny the transfer of firearms or the issuance of firearms (and explosives) licenses/permits to “dangerous terrorists” (S. 1237/H.R. 2074). In the 111th Congress, they reintroduced this bill (S. 1317/H.R. 2159), which supporters dubbed the “Terror Gap” proposal. In the 112th Congress, they introduced similar bills (S. 34 and H.R. 1506). And, in the 113th Congress they reintroduced their bills (S. 34 and H.R. 720) once more. When the Senate considered the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 (S. 649) in April 2013, Senator Lautenberg also filed an amendment (S.Amdt. 734) to that bill, which is nearly identical to S. 34. While the Senate leadership set S. 649 aside, if the Senate reconsiders this bill, it might also consider S.Amdt. 734. In addition, Representative James Moran has included similar provisions in the NRA Members’ Gun Safety Act of 2013 (H.R. 21). The Terror Gap proposal raises several potential issues for Congress. One, should the Attorney General notify watch-listed individuals who have been deemed to be “dangerous terrorists” for the purposes of gun control? Two, what form of redress and/or remedy would be provided to individuals wrongfully denied a firearm transfer because they were misidentified, or improperly watch-listed, and then deemed to be a “dangerous terrorist”? Three, if enacted, would such a law draw unwanted attention to related terrorist screening procedures, possibly undermining the effectiveness of these procedures by making terrorists and other adversaries aware of them, and possibly setting a judicial review precedent for other terrorist watchlist screening processes? Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: R42336: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736360 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736360 Shelf Number: 128858 Keywords: Background ChecksFirearmsHomeland SecurityTerrorismTerrorists (U.S.) |
Author: New York City Title: Gun Show Undercover: Report on Illegal Sales at Gun Shows Summary: Every weekend, thousands of Americans in all parts of the country attend local gun shows. Organized by gun-owners associations or professional promoters, the shows offer a chance to browse among dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of vendors. For many Americans, gun shows are a family outing. For the gun enthusiast, there are a huge variety of guns – new and used long guns and handguns, historical curios or related accessories – and for the general shopper there are often other vendors selling clothing, books, or local crafts. The vast majority of vendors and customers at gun shows are law abiding citizens out to enjoy a day with others who share a common interest. Unfortunately, gun shows are also considered a significant source of guns used in crimes. According to ATF, 30 percent of guns involved in federal illegal gun trafficking investigations are connected in some way to gun shows. In response to these concerns, the City of New York launched an undercover investigation of illegal sales at seven gun shows across three states. The investigation shows it is both feasible and easy for criminals to illegally buy guns at gun shows. Gun shows are a unique marketplace for guns because they feature sales from two types of vendors – federal firearm licensees (FFLs) and private sellers. By law, FFLs include anyone who sells guns professionally – at a gun store, a pawn shop, from their home, or at a gun show. Private sellers are individuals who are not “engaged in the business” but who may make “occasional sales” from their “personal collection.” FFLs and private sellers are subject to different federal standards regarding gun sales, most importantly regarding background checks and recordkeeping. FFLs are required to check every buyer in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) to prevent sales to felons, domestic violence misdemeanants or other federal categories of prohibited purchasers. NICS checks are done over the phone and are generally instantaneous. FFLs are also required to maintain the paperwork that connects each gun sold to its buyer. These requirements are designed to keep guns out of the hands of prohibited purchasers and prevent gun trafficking by allowing law enforcement to trace guns recovered in crime to their original point of sale. In contrast, because private sellers are presumed to be occasional sellers or hobbyists, they are under minimal regulation. They are not required to run background checks or keep records of their gun sales. However, even though federal law exempts private sales from background checks, it is still a felony for private sellers to sell to an individual they “know” or “have reason to believe” is a prohibited purchaser. Private sellers’ exemption from background checks and recordkeeping is often referred to as the “gun show loophole.” Even though this exemption applies regardless of where private sales take place, gun shows form a central market for prohibited purchasers to connect with private sellers who make anonymous gun sales. Federal law enforcement agencies have repeatedly expressed concerns about the impact of the gun show loophole on crime. According to a 1999 report by the Justice and Treasury Departments, “gun shows leave a major loophole in the regulation of firearms sales” because they “provide a large market where criminals can shop for firearms anonymously.” ATF has said “[gun] shows provide a ready supply of firearms to prohibited persons, gangs, violent criminals, and illegal firearms traffickers.” Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have all called for the end of private sales without instant background checks at gun shows. In addition to concerns about private sales at gun shows, ATF has noted that even FFLs who sell firearms at gun shows are a source of illegally trafficked guns. In 1999, the Departments of Justice and Treasury and ATF reported that 34 percent of the investigations connected to gun shows involved licensed dealers. According to ATF’s report, FFLs at gun shows committed numerous federal crimes, including selling to out-of-state residents, selling without a background check, and engaging in straw purchases. A straw purchase – a federal felony – occurs when a dealer allows someone to fill out the paperwork and undergo the background check, but that person is not the actual buyer of the gun. With no records of private sales at gun shows, it is almost impossible to know the exact extent of criminal activity that occurs there.11 In fact, there are no definitive answers to many basic questions one might ask about gun shows: the number of gun shows in America; how many guns are sold at gun shows; or how many private sellers operate at gun shows. The very aspects of gun shows that make them attractive to criminals – the lack of background checks and recordkeeping – also make it impossible to gather comprehensive information about undocumented sales that occur at those shows. To shed light on the practices of firearms sellers at gun shows, the City of New York launched an undercover investigation of illegal sales. The investigation covered seven gun shows spread across three states: Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee. Working undercover, agents conducted “integrity tests” of 47 sellers – both licensed dealers and private sellers – by simulating illegal gun sales at gun shows. The investigation sought answers to two questions: Question 1: Would private sellers sell guns to people who said they probably could not pass a background check? Question 2: Would licensed dealers sell guns to people who appear to be straw purchasers? Details: New York: City of New York, 2009. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 5, 2013 at: http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2009/pr442-09_report.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2009/pr442-09_report.pdf Shelf Number: 128962 Keywords: Background ChecksGun Shows (U.S.)Gun TraffickingGuns and CrimeIllegal Gun Sales |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Title: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Investigative Operations at Gun Shows Summary: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has the dual responsibilities of enforcing federal criminal laws regarding the possession and use of firearms and explosives, as well as regulating the firearms and explosives industries. ATF works to investigate and reduce crime involving firearms and explosives, acts of arson, and illegal trafficking of alcohol and tobacco products. As part of its enforcement of federal firearms laws, ATF has conducted operations at gun shows to investigate whether firearms are being sold or bought illegally. A gun show is an exhibition or gathering where guns, gun parts, ammunition, gun accessories, and literature are displayed, bought, sold, traded, and discussed. The types of guns displayed and sold at gun shows include new and used handguns, semi-automatic assault weapons, shotguns, rifles, and curio or relic firearms. The estimated number of gun shows held each year in the United States can range from 2,000 to 5,200.1 These shows provide a venue for the sale and exchange of firearms by federal firearms licensees (FFL) who are licensed by the federal government through ATF to manufacture, import, or deal in firearms. Such shows also are a venue for private sellers who buy and sell firearms for their personal collections or as a hobby. In these situations, the sellers are not required to have a federal firearms license. Although federal firearms laws apply to both FFLs and private sellers at gun shows, private sellers, unlike FFLs, are under no legal obligation to ask purchasers whether they are legally eligible to buy guns or to verify purchasers’ legal status through background checks.2 This mix of licensed and private firearms sellers makes gun shows a unique forum for gun sales. ATF’s investigative operations at gun shows received widespread attention in February 2006 when Congress held two hearings to examine the law enforcement techniques used by ATF agents at eight gun shows held in Richmond, Virginia, from May 2004 through August 2005.3 The first hearing presented testimony from four witnesses who alleged that ATF agents used aggressive and harassing techniques primarily at a gun show held on August 13 and 14, 2005, at the Richmond International Raceway in Virginia. Three of the witnesses were present at the gun show: the gun show promoter, a gun salesman who worked for a federally licensed dealer but represented himself as a private seller at the show, and a federally licensed dealer who had exhibited his firearms collection for sale at the Richmond gun show. The fourth witness was a private investigator who was hired by the National Rifle Association (NRA) to conduct an investigation of ATF enforcement activity at the August 2005 gun show. The witnesses alleged that ATF Special Agents and state and local police interrogated and intimidated gun buyers, targeted women and minorities as potential straw purchasers, visited the homes of buyers to verify their addresses, and detained some gun buyers after they left the gun show and seized their weapons without cause.4 At the second congressional hearing, representatives from ATF, the City of Richmond Police Department, and the Henrico County Division of Police responded to the allegations.5 The ATF representative acknowledged that some investigative techniques were not implemented in a manner consistent with ATF’s best practices but that the “focus at the Richmond-area gun shows was on indicators of criminal activity, not on the color of skin or the gender of potential suspects.”6 The representative from the City of Richmond Police Department stated that the Police Department had no intent to deny any citizen the ability to purchase a firearm, but rather to prevent the acquisition of a firearm in an illegal manner, and thereby reduce crime in the City of Richmond. The representative from the Henrico County Division of Police stated that county police officers conducted only six residency checks related to the Richmond gun show, and that each check took less than 20 minutes. The Henrico police official testified that no gun purchases by Henrico County residents were denied or delayed due to the checks. Subsequent to the congressional hearings, the House of Representatives passed a bill, H.R. 5092, known as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Modernization and Reform Act of 2006. The bill included language requesting that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) assess how ATF conducts “the gun show enforcement program and blanket residency checks of prospective and actual firearms purchasers.”7 The bill was subsequently forwarded to the Senate for consideration, but no vote was taken by the Senate in the 109th Congress and the proposed legislation was not enacted. In light of the congressional interest in this issue, the OIG conducted this review to examine the policies, procedures, and oversight mechanisms that guide ATF’s investigative operations at gun shows. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2007. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2007-007: Accessed June 6, 2013 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e0707/final.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e0707/final.pdf Shelf Number: 128969 Keywords: Background ChecksGun-Related ViolenceGuns and CrimeGuns Shows (U.S.)Illegal Gun Purchases |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Criminal History Records: Additional Actions Could Enhance the Completeness of Records Used For Employment-Related Background Checks Summary: Why GAO Did This Study Authorized employers use information from FBI criminal history record checks to assess a person's suitability for employment or to obtain a license. States create criminal records and the FBI facilitates access to these records by other states for nationwide checks. GAO was asked to assess efforts to address concerns about incomplete records, among other things. This report addresses to what extent (1) states conduct FBI record checks for selected employment sectors and face any challenges; (2) states have improved the completeness of records, and remaining challenges that federal agencies can help mitigate; and (3) private companies conduct criminal record checks, the benefits those checks provide to employers, and any related challenges. GAO analyzed laws and regulations used to conduct criminal record checks and assessed the completeness of records; conducted a nationwide survey, which generated responses from 47 states and the District of Columbia; and interviewed officials that manage checks from the FBI and 4 states (California, Florida, Idaho, and Washington). GAO selected states based on geographic location and other factors. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends, among other things, that the FBI establish plans with time frames for completing the Disposition Task Force's remaining goals. The Department of Justice concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-162: Accessed March 28, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668505.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668505.pdf Shelf Number: 134945 Keywords: Background ChecksCriminal Records (U.S.)Ex-offender Employment |
Author: National Employment Law Project Title: Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt Fair-Change Policies to Advance Employment Opportunities for People with Past Convictions Summary: Nationwide, 100 cities and counties have adopted what is widely known as "ban the box" so that employers consider a job candidate's qualifications first, without the stigma of a criminal record. These initiatives provide applicants a fair chance by removing the conviction history question on the job application and delaying the background check inquiry until later in the hiring. Momentum for the policy has grown exponentially, particularly in recent years. There are a total of fourteen states representing nearly every region of the country that have adopted the policies - California (2013, 2010), Colorado (2012), Connecticut (2010), Delaware (2014), Georgia (2015), Hawaii (1998), Illinois (2014, 2013), Maryland (2013), Massachusetts (2010), Minnesota (2013, 2009), Nebraska (2014), New Jersey (2014), New Mexico (2010), and Rhode Island (2013). Six states - Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island - have removed the conviction history question on job applications for private employers, which advocates embrace as the next step in the evolution of these policies. Federally, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) endorsed removing the conviction question from the job application as a best practice in its 2012 guidance making clear that federal civil rights laws regulate employment decisions based on arrests and convictions. The Obama Administration's My Brother's Keeper Task Force also gave the movement a boost when it endorsed hiring practices "which give applicants a fair chance and allows employers the opportunity to judge individual job candidates on their merits." Fair chance policies benefit everyone because they're good for families and the local community. At a recent event in Oakland for employers to discuss reentry issues, one business owner spoke to the personal benefit he finds from hiring people with records. "I've seen how a job makes all the difference," says Derreck B. Johnson, founder and president of Home of Chicken and Waffles in Oakland. "When I give someone a chance and he becomes my best employee, I know that I'm doing right by my community." This resource guide documents the 14 states, Washington D.C., and the 100 cities and counties -that have taken steps to remove barriers to employment for qualified workers with records. Six states, Washington D.C., and 25 cities and counties now extend the fair chance policy to government contractors or private employers. Of the localities, Baltimore, Buffalo, Chicago, Columbia (MO), Montgomery County (MD), Newark, Philadelphia, Prince George's County (MD), Rochester, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington D.C. extend their fair chance laws to private employers in the area. A chart summarizing all the policies is at the end of this guide. Details: New York: NELP, 2016. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 2, 2015 at: http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf?nocdn=1 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf?nocdn=1 Shelf Number: 135147 Keywords: Background ChecksBan the BoxCriminal ConvictionsCriminal RecordsEx-Offender Employment (U.S.) |
Author: South, Sandra Title: Scoping review: Evaluations of pre-employment screening practices for child-related work that aim to prevent child sexual abuse Summary: The aim of this scoping review was to map evaluations of pre-employment screening practices for child-related work that aim to prevent child sexual abuse. It was conducted by the Parenting Research Centre and the University of Melbourne for the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. This report describes the methods used to conduct the scoping review and the findings of the scoping review. Methods Systematic searches for existing evaluations of pre-employment screening practices for child-related work that aim to prevent child sexual abuse were conducted using an extensive list of electronic databases and websites, manually searching website publication lists (when no search engine was available) and searching the reference lists of potentially relevant studies. Results were then synthesised across study characteristics, including the methods employed and relevant key findings, and this was followed by a narrative interpretation of findings. Characteristics of the included evaluations Electronic database searches located 1,464 papers after duplicates were removed. A further 186 new papers were identified through website searches, through a concurrent review of child sexual abuse prevention in out-of-home care and via reference list checks. Twenty-five of these 1,650 papers were found to be suitable for inclusion in this scoping review. The 25 relevant evaluations were categorised into three general pragmatic categories of evaluation approaches in order to facilitate an overview of their relevance. They consisted of: 1. 19 retrospective case studies or surveys (including six public or ministerial inquiries) 2. Four qualitative analyses of submissions or hearings 3. Two evaluations of classification tools. The evaluations of the classification tools (category 3 above) found that tools for pre-employment screening that aimed to predict whether individual applicants would be at a high risk of committing sexual offences were neither sufficiently effective nor ethically feasible. As such, these two evaluations were not considered further in this scoping review beyond an explanation as to why such tools are unlikely to be reliable and valid. Evaluations were conducted in Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Evaluations were located in all the countries identified at the outset of this scoping review as most relevant for the work of the Royal Commission, with the exception of Canada. The target group (that is, the type of employment) addressed most commonly was child-related work, broadly defined. These studies addressed both paid employees and volunteers. Additional target groups included teachers and other private and public school staff, including volunteers; residential care providers or staff at children's homes; volunteers at organisations serving children and/or youth; and foster care providers and other adults who live and/or work in these settings. It is noteworthy that the majority of both the potentially relevant papers and the included evaluations were reports identified through website searches. Thus, the scientific discourse around these practices appears to be largely communicated through governmental and non-governmental agencies' reports (so-called 'grey literature') and to a lesser degree in peer-reviewed scientific journals. Relevant key findings stated by evaluation authors The review team compiled the findings, suggestions and recommendations of evaluation authors in each of the included studies in an effort to present a more nuanced understanding of the studies. These were not screened by the scoping review authors for methodological rigour and should be treated solely as the opinions of the authors, as stated in their evaluations. The authors of many of the included evaluations emphasised that criminal background checks appear to be universally considered as an important component of pre-employment screening practices. However, such statements were almost never made without emphasising the limited effectiveness of using criminal background checks as the only pre-employment screening practice to safeguard children from sexual abuse by staff. Indeed, many concerns were raised regarding factors that limit the feasibility and effectiveness of criminal background checks as a safeguard protecting children from sexual abuse, including (in order of most frequently to least frequently mentioned): - Time delays in the recruitment process due to the time needed to complete a criminal background check and/or the resulting decision to employ a person before the check is complete - The costs associated with conducting criminal background checks - The risk that an applicant may have changed their name, or give a pseudonym or nickname - The need to check for criminal offences in other jurisdictions (such as international or interstate jurisdictions) - The risks posed by those exempt from mandatory criminal background checks (for example, parents who volunteer when their child is present, and other adults who share the home with the caregiver and child) - A lack of reporting, confirmation and, therefore, criminal background checks of other adults who may be living in institutions (including foster or childcare homes) - Issues related to conflicting child protection and child welfare legislation regarding the need for, and actions to be taken based on, criminal background checks - Ethical concerns regarding infringing on a persons right to exoneration, privacy and/or rehabilitation due to sharing information about served, pardoned and quashed criminal convictions. The pre-employment screening practices other than criminal background checks (often referred to as sources of 'soft information' in the literature) that evaluation authors identified as necessary components of a comprehensive pre-employment screening procedure included (in order of most frequently to least frequently mentioned): - Conducting thorough reference checks (for example, those obtained directly from previous employers by asking direct questions about any concerns regarding the applicant's suitability to work with children) - Holding employment interviews that focus on determining the applicant's suitability to work with children (such as value-based interviewing; for more information, see Erooga, 2009) - Checking suspected or substantiated child abuse against other sources of information, such as child-abuse registries, children's court decisions or disciplinary body proceedings - Critically examining an applicant's employment history and/or written application (to identify gaps in their employment history and thus clarify their cause, or to explain ambiguous responses to direct questions about criminal history) - Verifying the applicant's identity using methods such as photo-based documents or fingerprinting - Verifying the applicant's education or qualifications (in order to determine if they are qualified to undertake child-related work). The need for comprehensive pre-employment screening practices was supported and underscored by many case examples where such practices were not followed and, as a result, unsuitable people gained employment in child-related work and went on to sexually abuse the children in their care. That people identified as unsuitable to work with children following pre-employment screening should be disqualified from doing so was implicit in all the literature identified in this scoping review. However, case examples examined in the included evaluations highlight that enforcing employment prohibitions, even in the face of evidence of child sexual abuse, was not always a matter of course. Details: Sydney: Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, 2014. 58p., app. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/3828bdcb-3689-4011-98a3-d2ebbf277718/Evaluations-of-pre-employment-screening-practices Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/3828bdcb-3689-4011-98a3-d2ebbf277718/Evaluations-of-pre-employment-screening-practices Shelf Number: 138367 Keywords: Background ChecksChild ProtectionChild Sexual AbuseCriminal BackgroundsPre-Employment Screening |
Author: Rodriguez, Michelle Natividad Title: Unlicensed and Untapped: Removing Barriers to State Occuptional Licenses for People with Records Summary: Nearly one in three U.S. adults has a record in the criminal justice system. It's hardly uncommon, but the resulting stigma and its lifelong consequences prove devastating for many. Sonja Blake is one of the estimated 70 million people in the United States who have an arrest or conviction record. Ms. Blake, a grandmother, cared for children at her Wisconsin in-home daycare center.[ii] After nearly a decade in business, her daycare-owner certification was permanently revoked after a change in state law, because of a 30-year-old misdemeanor conviction for overpayment of public assistance. conviction for overpayment of public assistance. Ms. Blake is one of the more than one-quarter of U.S. workers who require a state license to practice their occupations.[iii] In addition to the more typically known regulated jobs, such as nurses and teachers, many occupations in sales, management, and construction also require a state license. Critics of licensing argue that regulating occupations does little to advance safety or quality of service and instead negatively impacts consumers and low-wage workers. Others counter that state licensing for certain jobs is necessary to maintain public safety and results in higher practitioner wages and greater respect for the profession. Despite this disagreement over the value of licensing, common ground can be found in the call to reduce unnecessary conviction barriers to occupational licenses. Passing a criminal background check is a common requirement to obtain a state license. In fact, the American Bar Association's inventory of penalties against those with a record has documented 27,254 state occupational licensing restrictions. Thousands of these restrictions vary widely among states and professions. And because the criminal justice system disproportionately impacts people of color, these extrajudicial penalties - known as "collateral consequences" - perpetuate racial disparities in employment. Although no national data exists as to the number of people denied licenses because of these collateral consequences, analogous data is available in the hiring context. For example, after submitting a job application, people with records on average are only half as likely to get a callback as those without a record. And for black men with records, the impact is more severe - only one in three receive a callback. Thus, having a conviction record, particularly for people of color, is a major barrier to participation in the labor market. Details: National Employment Law Project, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2016 at: http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Unlicensed-Untapped-Removing-Barriers-State-Occupational-Licenses.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Unlicensed-Untapped-Removing-Barriers-State-Occupational-Licenses.pdf Shelf Number: 138836 Keywords: Background ChecksCollateral ConsequencesCriminal RecordsEmploymentEx-offender Employment |
Author: Doleac, Jennifer L. Title: Does "Ban the Box" Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories are Hidden Summary: Jurisdictions across the United States have adopted "ban the box" (BTB) policies preventing employers from conducting criminal background checks until late in the job application process. Their goal is to improve employment outcomes for those with criminal records, with a secondary goal of reducing racial disparities in employment. However, removing information about job applicants' criminal histories could lead employers who don't want to hire ex-offenders to try to guess who the ex-offenders are, and avoid interviewing them. In particular, employers might avoid interviewing young, low-skilled, black and Hispanic men when criminal records are not observable. This would worsen employment outcomes for these already-disadvantaged groups. In this paper, we use variation in the details and timing of state and local BTB policies to test BTB's effects on employment for various demographic groups. We find that BTB policies decrease the probability of being employed by 3.4 percentage points (5.1%) for young, low-skilled black men, and by 2.3 percentage points (2.9%) for young, low-skilled Hispanic men. These findings support the hypothesis that when an applicant's criminal history is unavailable, employers statistically discriminate against demographic groups that are likely to have a criminal record. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper 22469: Accessed August 3, 2016 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22469.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22469.pdf Shelf Number: 139964 Keywords: Background ChecksCriminal Records Ex-offender Employment |
Author: Berracasa, Colenn Title: The Impact of Ban the Box in the District of Columbia Summary: Why ODCA Did This Audit The District's Fair Criminal Record Screening Amendment Act of 20141 (FCRSA) instructed the Office of the District of Columbia Auditor to provide the D.C. Council with a report on the impact of this act on employers. What We Found This report evaluates the implementation and impact of FCRSA, more commonly known as "ban the box." The law prevents employers located within the District from asking about a job applicant's criminal record until after a conditional offer of employment is made, and the law also limits the reasons for which those employers may retract an offer of employment made to a person with a criminal record. The law is designed to "remove unfair barriers to employment" and allow "returning citizens" - people who have served time in jail or prison and who are reintegrating into society - to get a "foot in the door." This report reflects fieldwork conducted from January through late April 2016. Our research aimed to assess the implementation of the law, to evaluate its effects on hiring outcomes for returning citizens (specifically on hiring within the District government), and to evaluate its impact on private-sector employers. To investigate these questions, we used several methods: analysis of District government administrative data, a private employer survey, and interviews with a subset of private employers. We were limited to reviewing District Department of Human Resources (DCHR) hiring data for District government hires due to lack of availability of the same private-sector data on hiring outcomes for returning citizens. In examining the law's implementation to date, we found that many businesses reported being unfamiliar with the law based on our surveys and interviews. Then, looking at enforcement of the law, we found many complaints against employers filed with the District's Office of Human Rights (OHR) (over 417 within the first nine months); however, 95 addresses account for most of the complaints. Of the 417 complaints, 71 have resulted in monetary settlements and 89 were closed. The complaints data show that some employers did not follow the requirements of the law and thus appear consistent with our survey and interview finding that many employers reported being unfamiliar with the law. These two findings inform our first and second recommendations about the District government's public outreach regarding the law. Additionally, the small number of individuals submitting complaints may indicate that many returning citizens are not aware of their rights under the law; thus, our fourth recommendation suggests the District government review its processes for informing returning citizens of their rights. When analyzing the effects of the law on hiring outcomes for returning citizens, we found that District agencies did increase the share of hires of returning citizens for positions requiring a background check. However, the lack of comparable private-sector data informed our fifth recommendation that the District government conduct further research on hiring outcomes for returning citizens. Finally, in analyzing the law's effect on private employers' hiring practices, we found that the law likely does not apply to many District businesses; in fact, just 25 percent of the businesses we surveyed reporting being subject to the law's effects. Additionally, a majority of employers reported minimal impact on their hiring processes. Finally, a minority of businesses reported some impact, indicating that the law increased the cost, length and/or complexity of their hiring processes. This concern over the burden of the law resulted in our third recommendation that the District government should consider providing technical assistance or tools for private employers to share best practices for complying with the law. Overall, many District businesses interviewed support the spirit of the law. What We Recommend: 1. The Mayor and Council should direct more resources to outreach and public education to ensure that all District businesses are aware of the requirements under FCRSA. 2. The Council should consider including a requirement that implementing agencies develop a public outreach and education plan -and funding to support it - in all future pieces of legislation that make substantial changes to employment law and worker rights. 3. The Mayor should consider instructing relevant District agencies to provide technical assistance or create tools for employers to share best practices to increase compliance and minimize costs and procedural burdens. 4. The District should conduct further research on the impact that FCRSA has had on returning citizens' experiences and job outcomes. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the District of Columbia Auditor, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2016 at: http://www.dcauditor.org/sites/default/files/FCRSA%20-%20Ban%20the%20Box%20Report_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.dcauditor.org/sites/default/files/FCRSA%20-%20Ban%20the%20Box%20Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 148135 Keywords: Background ChecksBan the BoxCriminal RecordsEx-Offender Employment |
Author: Goggins, Becki Title: State Progress in Record Reporting for Firearm-Related Checks: Protection Order Submissions Summary: A protection order - also known as a restraining order, order of protection, protective order, or an injunction - is an order issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing violence or threatening acts or harassment against, sexual violence, or contact or communication with or physical proximity to another person.1 This order may also contain other provisions such as requiring the abuser to relinquish firearms and/or refrain from all contact with the victim of abuse. When the subject of the protection order violates the terms established by the court, the victim can ask law enforcement (or the court) to enforce the order. In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which requires all U.S. states and territories to give "full faith and credit" to all valid orders of protection issued by other jurisdictions including tribal lands, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories. The intent of this provision is to ensure that victims of abuse can call upon law enforcement for protection no matter where they are in the country. While persons who have been granted protection orders are encouraged to keep a copy of the order with them at all times, sometimes this is simply not practical or even possible. Since many jurisdictions require validation of a protection order if it cannot be visually inspected, it is important that protection orders be entered into the Protection Order File of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) as this is the best way to ensure that a record of its existence can be confirmed by law enforcement across the nation. For firearm- and explosive-related background checks the federal law contains provisions that narrow the circumstances when a protection order serves as a bar to receiving a firearm. The protection order must restrain the person who is the subject of the protection order from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner or child of such intimate partner, or prevent the subject of the order from engaging in other conduct that would place the partner or child in reasonable fear of bodily injury. An intimate partner is defined as the spouse of the person, a former spouse of the person, an individual who is a parent of a child of the person, and an individual who cohabits or has cohabited with the person. In addition, the protection order must arise from a hearing in which the subject of the order had both notice and opportunity to participate. Some states have enacted laws expanding the nature of the relationship or types of conduct underlying the issuance of a protection order; these expanded-parameter protection orders serve as state disqualifiers for receiving a firearm. Details: Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts; Sacramento: SEARCH - National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249864.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249864.pdf Shelf Number: 140374 Keywords: Background ChecksDomestic ViolenceGun ControlProtection OrdersRestraining Orders |
Author: Greenberg, Mark Title: Rethinking Gun Violence Summary: This working paper develops the argument of "Gun Violence and Gun Control" (also posted on SSRN), a short piece commissioned by the London Review of Books. We decided not to publish either paper, in part because we felt there were empirical issues that we were not in a position to assess. We welcome comments on either paper. In this Article, we propose a new way of approaching the problem of gun violence, synthesizing features of a number of successful initiatives. We begin, in Part I of this Article, by examining the gun debate. We argue that it is focused on the wrong question. Once attention is focused on the right question, it becomes clear how to develop a gun violence reduction strategy that is not subject to the standard objections to gun control. As an illustration of the wrong turn the debate has taken, we take as a case study Joyce Malcolm's recent Guns and Violence. The book attempts to use a historical study of guns and violence in England, as well as a brief comparison with the U.S., to develop policy prescriptions for the U.K. Malcolm is a respected academic historian, and her work, both in this book and in the past, has helped give wide currency to the view that increasing the number of guns in private hands is an effective way of reducing violent crime. Although the book has been widely praised by those on the same side of the debate, it has glaring defects in reasoning and scholarship. Malcolm fails even to notice that there is an option other than more guns or fewer guns. In Part II of the Article, we proffer a broad strategy for reducing gun violence. The essence of the strategy is to focus on keeping guns out of the wrong hands, rather than on reducing or increasing the number of guns generally. Although most writers (to the extent they consider the matter at all) assume otherwise, there is strong reason to conclude keeping guns out of the wrong hands - and doing so without reducing the number of guns in circulation - is a tractable problem, which is not to say that it is an easy or completely soluble one. The strategy has two parts, a demand side and a supply side. On the demand side, the strategy begins from the fact that a disproportionate amount of violent crime is committed by a very small number of identifiable persons. Moreover, although it is not generally appreciated, the criminal justice system has tremendous leverage over these recidivist offenders, for example, because most of them are subject to parole supervision. On the supply side, the crucial starting point is that the black market that supplies criminals with guns depends substantially on the legitimate market, and in particular on purchases of guns from licensed firearms dealers (as opposed to, for example, haphazard thefts). Powerful tools are available for cutting off the flow of guns from licensed dealers into the black market. The widely held view that there are simply too many guns already in circulation for supply-side policies to work is unjustifiably dismissive of suppositions about human behavior that are fundamental to the law, as well as of the admittedly tentative empirical evidence of recent gun-violence reduction initiatives. Details: Los Angeles: University of California at Los Angeles, School of Law, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 10-02 : Accessed October 20, 2016 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531371 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531371 Shelf Number: 145887 Keywords: Background ChecksGun ControlGun ViolenceGun-Related Violence |
Author: Stewart, Peter A. Title: Middle Ground on Gun Control Summary: Each tragic shooting incident that the American news media covers highlights the problem of gun violence in the United States. However, the focus of this reporting is rarely on the largest component of total gun deaths: suicides. Suicides make up two-thirds of all gun deaths. Limiting access to firearms for individuals with suicidal tendencies could cause a significant reduction in the total number of casualties included in gun violence statics. This thesis examines the efficacy of adding more mental health information to the FBI's database of persons who are prohibited from gun purchases, and also compares U.S. gun laws to the National Firearms Agreement in Australia, which is widely accepted as an effective gun control measure. This research finds that mental health information on clinical depression and schizophrenia can be a strong predictor of suicidal tendencies, and reporting of this information could be improved in order to reduce overall gun violence. Improved mental health reporting must be a matter of federal law, because current state laws on guns vary widely and have limited effectiveness Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. 83p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798872 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798872 Shelf Number: 141333 Keywords: Background ChecksCriminal Background ChecksGun ControlGun Control PolicyGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceMental Health |
Author: Appleton, Josie Title: Checking Up: How the Coalition's plans to cut back on criminal records checks have been defeated Summary: Since 2002, more than 40 million criminal records checks have been carried out at a cost of nearly two billion pounds, yet there has never been any significant research showing the effectiveness of mass vetting in child protection terms. In June 2010, the Coalition government promised to 'scale back' criminal records checks to 'common-sense proportions', predicting that its reforms would lead to a halving of checks from around four million to 1.7 million. This has not happened. In 2013-14, there were 3,948,793 criminal records checks at a cost of L211.6 million. Far from being scaled back, in certain ways the vetting system appears to have become more complicated, expansive and expensive. Vetting is encouraged by state agencies, such as local authorities and regulators, who demand checks even beyond current guidance. Furthermore, the interests of the regulators and the private bodies that rely on income from the checks mean that they will have little interest in reducing unnecessary vetting. This report argues that the current scale of investment in vetting is out of proportion to its positive effects. There is a need to go back to the drawing board and to ask if criminal records checks are the best manner in which to be spending L200 million a year. Details: London: Civitas, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 31, 2017 at: http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/CheckingUp.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/CheckingUp.pdf Shelf Number: 146620 Keywords: Background ChecksChild ProtectionCriminal Records |
Author: Everytown for Gun Safety Title: Danger in the Land of Enchantment: Investigating online gun sales in New Mexico Summary: In October 2016, a violent felon from Deming tried to buy a gun. He had recently served time in prison for three felonies related to a domestic violence incident: armed with a revolver, he choked his fiancee, told her he would break her neck, and tried to force her into the trunk of her car.1 His felony convictions made it illegal for him to buy or possess firearms - but now he was online and actively shopping for a Glock handgun. If he had tried to buy one at a licensed dealer, where background checks are legally required, his felony convictions would have blocked the sale. Instead, he turned to online ads - where, because of a loophole in the law in New Mexico, gun sales can be arranged with no background check required. Policymakers have long recognized that it's dangerous for people with a felony conviction, a history of domestic abuse, or serious mental illness to have guns.2 People with such records, like the man described above, are legally prohibited from buying or possessing guns. That's why licensed gun dealers - Walmart, Dick's Sporting Goods, or any of the hundreds of local gun stores across New Mexico - are legally required to contact the background check system to run a check on every buyer. When someone who is not allowed to have a gun attempts to make a purchase, the background check blocks the sale. But there's a problem with this system. In New Mexico, because of a dangerous loophole in the law - referred to as the background check loophole - background checks are not required when guns are sold by individuals who are not licensed dealers.3 These sales are called "unlicensed" gun sales, and they aren't just taking place between friends or neighbors - they're taking place on the internet. Websites like Armslist.com, the "Craigslist for guns," provide a platform for unlicensed gun sales to be arranged online, between strangers. Because of the background check loophole, criminals can turn to these online unlicensed sales to arm themselves illegally, no background check required, no questions asked. To understand how often criminals in New Mexico take advantage of the background check loophole to buy guns in unlicensed online sales, Everytown investigators (1) examined the size of the state's unlicensed online sale market, and (2) posted for-sale ads online, tracking how many responses were from New Mexicans prohibited by law from buying or possessing firearms. Details: New York: Everytown for Gun Safety, 2017. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/EGS-031-NewMexico_5a_020817.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/EGS-031-NewMexico_5a_020817.pdf Shelf Number: 149787 Keywords: Background ChecksFirearmsGun Control PolicyIllegal Guns |
Author: Jacobs, James B. Title: The Potential and Limitations of Universal Background Checking for Gun Purchasers Summary: Current federal law defies logic in requiring that only purchasers who buy from federally licensed sellers be subject to background checking. Thus, universal background checking is frequently proposed as the best and most important form of "sensible gun control". Upon closer inspection, however, universal background checking would be harder to implement and enforce than proponents recognize. Moreover, the likely payoff in reduction of gun homicides, crimes and suicides would be less than what is often assumed. This Article closely examines universal background checking in theory and practice, including the Manchin-Toomey Amendment which Congress rejected in 2013 but which continues to be reintroduced. Details: New York: New York University School of Law, 2017. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers; accessed April 19, 2018 at: http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1590&context=nyu_plltwp Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1590&context=nyu_plltwp Shelf Number: 149851 Keywords: Background ChecksGun ControlGun PolicyGuns |